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THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF ETHICS
Margaret Raymond*
The discussion of training reflected in this conference largely addresses
how, in the current climate, we can turn new law graduates into
experienced, capable and competent lawyers. My particular interest is in
the importance of teaching law graduates to be ethical lawyers.1 I start
with a provocative hypothesis: that the current versions of our ethical rules
and the structure of law firms have the potential to encourage the
professionalization of ethics rather than connecting all practitioners to the
values of professional responsibility.
This development is consistent with the move to specialization in the
profession as a whole. Specialization unquestionably has its benefits. The
job of ethics advising and professional responsibility decision-making has,
through professionalization, been situated somewhere, with a clear set of
responsible persons. Nonetheless, these trends are a concern because
ethical responsibility cannot be fully delegated. Lawyers can and should
turn to ethics specialists to assist with complex issues, but the radar
required to spot those issues and the awareness that consultation is
necessary are nondelegable skills. It is certainly possible to view ethics as
a complex legal discipline, getting—as most disciplines are—more
complicated with the passage of time. Mastering vast networks of
regulation, a burgeoning body of precedent, and voluminous scholarly
commentary makes expertise in any area demanding and difficult. In this,
ethics is surely not unique. Yet, all lawyers have a commitment to follow
their professional responsibility obligations. They cannot decline expertise
*Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. Thanks to Gerald Wetlaufer for helpful
suggestions, to the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics for the invitation to participate in
this Conference, and to Cynthia Lohman and Justin McCarty for excellent legal research
assistance.
1. The term “legal ethics” is subject to some critique. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton,
The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call for a
Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411,
441 (2005) (arguing that the phrase “legal ethics” is improper because rules of professional
responsibility deal with professional regulation rather than “ethics”). As is commonly done,
I will use the term Alegal ethics” to reflect compliance with professional responsibility
standards for attorneys, recognizing that it is distinct from “ethics” in a philosophical or
moral sense.
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in this area in the same way they can pass on other substantive issues—tax,
or ERISA, or environmental law—which they know they lack the
expertise, and perhaps the interest, to handle competently. 2 Telling
pressured and overwhelmed lawyers that this area is, in effect, way too
complex for them to master may cause them to lack ownership of ethics
principles.
This Article sets out the factors that contribute to the increased
professionalization of professional responsibility in large law firms. It
argues that we should rethink the ever-growing, elaborate and exegetical
texture of ethics rules, and that a version of the professional responsibility
rules, more accessible to the ordinary, non-expert practitioner, would be a
valuable contribution.
I start with three premises: that new lawyers find themselves in an
environment where independent performance at top speed is at a premium,
that specialization is a paramount value, and that the rules of legal ethics
are getting more and more complex and elaborate. This combination
makes it extremely difficult for new lawyers to think of ethics issues as
matters for which they can take responsibility. Instead, it becomes a matter
for the “professionals”—ethics experts within the law firms. While the
development of an institutional infrastructure of expertise is undoubtedly
beneficial, we need to consider carefully how to maintain the connection of
new lawyers to their own ethical responsibilities.
In her paper, Professor Elizabeth Chambliss accuses me of the “nirvana
fallacy”—of rejecting approaches to ethics decision-making in favor of a
failed and nostalgic ideal of collegial decision-making and individual
accountability. I share Professor Chambliss’s skepticism about false
nostalgia for the nonexistent golden era of lawyering, and have articulated
similar critiques elsewhere.3 More significantly, I think Professor

2. These problems of specialization resemble the ethics problem in that the lawyer
consulting a specialist needs to know just enough to see that the expert’s counsel is
necessary. Developing and maintaining that sensitivity is critical in the current culture of
professionalization. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
3. See Margaret Raymond, Criminal Defense Heroes, 13 WIDENER L.J. 167, 167-68
(2003) (noting that “I am a little concerned that we are unduly glorifying the past, convinced
that the olden days represented some now-bygone era of courageous, committed
lawyering . . . . I am always a little skeptical of those who wax nostalgic for the old days of
lawyering, when a lawyer’s word was his bond and when common ground and common
backgrounds obviated the need for civility codes. Those were also the days when
advertising and solicitation restrictions were wielded aggressively to keep immigrant
lawyers from developing practices; when persons of color were restricted from attending
public law schools; and when women, trained as lawyers, were offered positions as
secretaries, evidently because they lacked the one necessary accoutrement for the practice of
law.”)
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Chambliss posits a false dichotomy between bureaucratized systems and
individual accountability. Contrary to her assertions, I do not condemn the
creation of ethics infrastructure—far from it. Yet ethics infrastructure
functions—and its proponents recognize that it functions—only when it
harmonizes effectively with individual ethics awareness and accountability.
In view of Professor Chambliss’s recognition that even firms with some
ethics infrastructure provide little guidance to their lawyers on a range of
issues, including proper billing practices, investments in clients, and
control of client funds, the need for individual accountability even in a firm
with ethics infrastructure remains evident.
Ultimately, Professor Chambliss agrees. She suggests that the true value
of compliance specialists is not that, in some “legalistic” fashion, they will
increase fear of enforcement and therefore compliance. Instead, using an
“institutional” model of regulation, the existence of compliance specialists
will alter the norms of firm culture, enabling specialists to play a role “in
educating and socializing firm members.” The goal of educating and
socializing firm members is, ultimately, an increase in individual
accountability. My suggestion in this paper is only that the creation of
ethics specialists in an increasingly complex and highly regulated ethics
environment may pose some challenges to the continuing goal of individual
ethics awareness and accountability. On the need to maintain such
awareness and accountability, I would be surprised if we disagree.
I.

THE NEED FOR SPEED

The first development that affects this situation is the newly developed
expectation that lawyers are constantly accessible and available around the
clock, and that they will speedily respond to any inquiry from a superior or
client. The most ubiquitous comment from lawyers participating in the
conference concerned these expectations of constant access and speedy
response.
This development is in part the product of new technologies.
Cellphones, Blackberries, and wireless communications have created “a
world of invisibility and speed,”4 where “new habits of thought . . . emerge
from the compression of time and space and the expectation that everyone
should be available all the time.” 5 The existence of these technologies
creates the potential for new expectations: that lawyers will be instantly

4. Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, Respond Now! E-mail, Acceleration, and a Pedagogy of
Patience, in PEDAGOGY: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO TEACHING LITERATURE, LANGUAGE,
COMPOSITION AND CULTURE, Vol. 4, No. 3, 365 (2004).
5. Id. at 366.
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accessible and responsive to clients or superiors on an around-the-clock
basis. 6
This expectation is not simply the product of technology, but a reflection
of an increasingly competitive environment for business development.7
While technology facilitates continuous access and availability, the need to
provide superior client service drives the notion that such access and
availability is a critical component of doing the job.8 A firm not providing
real-time responsive service to its clients around the clock runs the risk of
losing those clients to a firm that will; 9 the ability to respond quickly, and
to be accessible on demand, thus becomes an obligation to do so. 10
So one factor we have to take into account is that young lawyers are
expected to move fast, and to be accessible and responsive around the
clock. This means two things for those new lawyers. First, the need to
show that you can and will produce an answer on a short timeline reduces
the time you have to contemplate a complex issue. Responsiveness is
assessed on a different timetable, one which might not allow the kind of
6. See, e.g., Ross E. Davies, Learning from Laptops, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at 29
(“Standard equipment for your average associate these days includes a laptop and a
BlackBerry . . . . These technological wonders endow the associate with unprecedented
flexibility to get work done and stay in touch with the office without having to be there.
This works well for the associate—who can, for example, work at home sometimes and save
commuting time. And it works well for the law firm—which can, for example, contact a
vacationing associate in the beach via BlackBerry with an emergency assignment for her to
complete using her convenient laptop.”).
7. See Angela West, Meeting Demands With Technology, NAT’L L. J., Mar. 22, 2004,
at S1. West notes that “[t]oday’s legal clients are looking for a law firm that has a solid
technology infrastructure and knows how to use technology in order to guarantee excellent
customer service,” and that “[h]ow firms keep clients happy through technology will
continue to play a key role in effective business development.” Id. Important technology
includes “handheld wireless devices as a tool for 24/7 access.” Id. Further, “[w]ith the
nature of international business running on a 24/7 basis, the development of devices that
give clients instant access to their legal counsel will also remain important.” Id.
8. See Anthony Paonita, Look, Ma, No Wires, CORP. COUNS., Sept. 2004, at 69
(describing how one general counsel’s relationship with his outside counsel changed when
he switched to a BlackBerry: “He used to engage in unproductive voicemail duels, but now
he can email outside counsel and they respond quickly. ‘You can get [the answer] you want
when you want it.’”).
9. See Carol L. Schlein, What Every Firm Needs, N.J. LAW., May 5, 2003 at 8 (“As
technology has matured, it has put increasing demands on legal professionals. [C]ell phones,
Blackberries and remote access to e-mail have elevated client expectations. Lawyers must
master these tools to meet these expectations.”).
10. I remember being amazed in 1987 that, through the use of the fax machine, we could
effectively serve our Australian clients around the clock: what I faxed off at the close of
business on our day was faxed back to us with changes and suggestions by the time I got to
the office the next morning. That brave new world has advanced extraordinarily; the
twenty-four hour workday—even without the benefit of time difference—has become the
expectation.
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mature reflection most of us would view as important in the development
of an ethical sensibility. 11 Second, the need to respond quickly adds to the
pressure to specialize.
II. THE PRESSURE TO SPECIALIZE
Even new lawyers are encouraged, early on, to become experts in
something. Professional development literature urges specialization as a
formula for success. 12 It is not enough, as a young lawyer, to work hard at
the assignments you are given and develop the skills of a generalist.13
Specialization is touted as a way to develop expertise, stand out from the
crowd, and do an effective job of marketing yourself. 14 Specialization is
urged by insurers as well, 15 and this trend towards specialization is
reflected across the profession. 16 The pressure to move quickly only

11. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 717 (1998) (noting that “Everyone in the firm feels
the pressures of overburdened time and the need to make snap decisions on insufficient
sleep and reflection: ‘There’s too much to do and no time to think,’ and in any case there is
no standard billing category for such things as ‘Time for consultation and deliberation on
ethical issues.’”).
12. See, e.g., Ward Bower, Ten Action Steps for More Profitable, Productive Practices,
L. PRAC. MGMT., April 1999, at 30 (“In today’s economy, no one wants a generalist to
handle their problem; everyone wants a specialist. A specialist almost always wins against a
generalist. Large-firm lawyers learned this long ago. Solos and lawyers in small firms also
should specialize . . . .”); Ezra Tom Clark, Jr., Characteristics of Successful Law Firms, 24
L. PRAC. MGMT. 40 (1998) (“Successful law firms must have a focus or raison d’etre, and
each lawyer should develop specialized expertise consistent with the firm’s mission.”).
13. Noted one commencement speaker, “[L]awyers have not traditionally sought to
specialize in any one aspect of the law. Indeed, once you have passed the bar exam . . . you
are officially deemed capable of doing almost any legal work . . . .
You may,
understandably, be reluctant to orchestrate the merger between Time Warner and AOL
without some help. Luckily for you, Time Warner and AOL are likely to be equally as
reluctant to have you do so . . . . Increasingly, corporations and other clients are demanding
that their lawyers be specialists in the areas for which they are hired . . . . Law firms and
lawyers throughout the country are responding to these client demands.” Hon. Lee R. West,
Oklahoma City University Law School May 11, 2003 Commencement Address, 29 OKLA.
CITY U.L. REV. 453, 457 (2004).
14. William J. Wernz, The Ethics of Large Law Firms: Responses and Reflections, 16
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 187 (2002) (“Prominent among the assets of large firms is highly
specialized knowledge . . . . Because much specialized knowledge is highly technical and
concerns issues that appear amoral, there is an understandable tendency for the lawyerspecialist to think of himself as a technician.”).
15. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 199 (2002) (noting
the importance of specialization and that “dabblers will pay a price” in the insurance arena).
16. Ted Schneyer, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 521, 523 (2002) (“American lawyers are becoming ever more specialized. Many now
practice in one narrowly defined field of law and serve a very limited clientele.”). Even
small firms and solo practitioners tend towards specialization. Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical
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increases this tendency, since specialized knowledge facilitates speedy
response. The need to specialize has extended to the area of professional
responsibility. Many firms are creating a culture of expertise in ethics,17
developing a structure of internal “ethics compliance specialists.” 18 The
creation of varied patterns of “ethical infrastructure” 19 in law firms is good
news. While these structures involve a range of titles, responsibilities, and
authority, 20 they reflect that firms are recognizing the need to focus on and
attend to ethics issues. 21 They also create an internal resource and, one
hopes, an internal culture of ethics consultation and reflection. It is a
significant positive development that there are particular individuals in the
firms who view these issues as their responsibility. Firms which in the past
lacked a clear structure for internal ethics advice, direction and expertise
reflected both a lack of concern and a lack of competence which created the
potential for a wholly inadequate response to ethics concerns.22
World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 309, 316, 325-27
(2004).
17. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical
Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV.
691, 692 (2002) (noting that “anecdotal evidence suggests that large law firms increasingly
rely on in-house ethics advisors, firm general counsel, and other internal specialists to
manage the firm’s compliance with ethics and malpractice regulation”); see also Elizabeth
Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 335, 346 (2003) (hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, New Framework) (noting
that “large law firms increasingly are turning to in-house specialists to manage the firm’s
compliance with professional regulation”).
18. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors,
General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV.
559, 565 (2002) (hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role) (reflecting the fact that
such specialists have widely varying titles and responsibilities).
19. See Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the
“Ethical Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 246 (1998).
20. See, e.g., ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note
15, at 199 (describing Winston and Strawn’s “conflict of interest” monitoring mechanism,
which involves a partner, two part-time lawyers and thirteen college graduates). Baker and
McKenzie described a nine-person professional responsibility committee and a full-time
director of professional responsibility. Id.
21. Chambliss and Wilkins argue for requiring law firms to designate compliance
specialists to “increas[e] firms’ accountability for structural controls,” Chambliss &
Wilkins, New Framework, supra note 17, at 349, and to “increas[e] the authority and
effectiveness of specialists within firms.” Id.
22. See, e.g., Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 565 (One of the
lawyers interviewed for the Chambliss & Wilkins study commented, “[W]hen I joined the
firm 20 years ago, there was a senior partner with a copy of the Model Code in his office
and that was the ethics department.”); see also Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net:
The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 859
(1998) (describing the following comment from an associate’: “I’ve worked at two firms,
and I think that in both firms, certainly, you would be encouraged to bring anything that you
felt was a clear problem to the right place—although, quite frankly, I couldn’t tell you what
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The motivation behind this development is multifaceted. In part, it
reflects concerns about liability; appropriate infrastructure assures insurers
that a compliance system is in place. 23
It may reflect a desire to provide for a separate “ethics counsel” for
confidentiality or privilege purposes, to create a climate of awareness, to
play a preventive role in avoiding ethics problems, 24 or to seek to build
trust so that lawyers in the firm will be more likely to approach the
designated person for ethics advice. It also reflects the increasing
complexity of legal ethics as a substantive discipline, 25 whose disregard has
a significant downside potential for the firms. 26
But the internal focus on ethics specialists also suggests that ethics is
just another area of specialization, one in which someone else is developing
expertise so you don’t have to. 27 This runs the risk of shuttling the
consideration of ethics to the designated individuals, taking ethical issues
out of mainstream discourse. 28 Moreover, except in a specialized practice

the right place was, in either one of those firms, because they didn’t designate anyone in
particular, to my knowledge.”).
23. See, e.g., ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note
15, at 135 (discussing National Conference on Legal Malpractice and Risk Management and
noting that “[i]nsurers play a major role in insuring that law firms have systems in place”);
Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 559-60; see also Weinstock, supra
note 4 (noting that ALAS, the Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society, “has played an
important role in promoting the formal appointment of in-house compliance specialists”).
24. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 560 (“proponents argue
that in-house specialists may play an important preventive role by increasing firm-wide
awareness of ethics and regulatory issues”).
25. See Karen Donovan, When Big Law Firms Trip Over Their Own Clients, N.Y.
TIMES, October 3, 2004, at 5 (quoting Stephen Gillers as saying “‘I’ve seen the doctrines
become increasingly complex and almost inscrutable, and that’s why lawyers need lawyers
to help them stay safe.’”); Chambliss & Wilkins, New Framework, supra note 17, at 346-47
(“Commentators attribute firms’ increasing reliance on in-house specialists to the increasing
complexity of professional regulation and the increasing number of claims against
lawyers.”).
26. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 578 (noting that
participants in their focus groups “cited the increasing complexity of ethics and regulatory
issues and the resulting need for individual specialization” as the reason that firms moved
from committee-based ethics infrastructure to individual ethics specialists).
27. See, e.g., Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, The Inside Story, THE PROF. LAW. 22 (“in
light of the increasing complexity of legal ethics issues, it makes no more sense to have
everyone at the firm be an expert in legal ethics issues than it would to have everyone in a
general practice firm be an expert in the details of ERISA or workers’ compensation law”).
As one associate in another study noted, “ethics is talked about the first day and never talked
about again.” Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges’ and
Lawyers’ Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 826
(1998).
28. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 579 (“[T]he use of
specialists involves fewer partners in day-to-day-decisions and may serve to limit internal
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that does ethics work for clients, the development of ethics expertise
probably looks to junior lawyers like a specialization best avoided:29 it is
largely of internal service, 30 may be unlikely to generate increased
compensation, 31 and is better deferred to more experienced and more senior
colleagues.
Moreover, the availability of the ethics expert is uneven. Larger firms
tend to have a more developed “ethical infrastructure” than small firms.32
Even within large firms that have committed to such infrastructure, the
models of how it is structured and made available vary widely. 33 And
some—including Professor Chambliss—have expressed doubts that ethical
infrastructure will truly be an effective resource for junior lawyers,
particularly those concerned about the professional responsibility of
partners. 34 More important, the mere existence of specialists in firms—
available for consultation and advice—does not assure adequate attention
to matters of professional responsibility because lawyers need to know

dialogue about ethical issues.”).
29. Noted one associate, “There is no . . . market for ethical practice.” Gordon, supra
note 11, at 716.
30. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 572 (noting the
comment of one lawyer that he believed the “firm management” tasks he was undertaking as
an ethics compliance lawyer were “ignored . . . at compensation time”); cf. id. at 573; see
also Model Rule 1.8, infra note 46 (describing a firm that treats “in-house and outside work
equivalently for compensation purposes”). Other sources view this more frankly—one
commentator notes that “in a setting where the Ethics Committee is known as the ‘No
Business Committee,’ the routine ceremonies of business production can inadvertently
convey the symbolic message that ethical consultation is just one step above napping at
one’s desk.” Suchman, supra note 22, at 864.
31. One such full-time ethics specialist commented that his arrangement had
fundamentally altered his compensation arrangements: “I’m still a partner, but I have given
up my rights to be compensated like a partner.” Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role,
supra note 18, at 573. The article goes on to note that uncompensated ethics specialists term
the work a “burden,” while compensated specialists “tend to play a much broader and more
proactive role in their firms.” Id. at 574. Suchman notes that none of the attorneys in the
“Ethics Beyond the Rules” study “saw anything to be gained in their firm’s compensation
and promotion process from exceptionally high ethical conduct.” Suchman, supra note 22,
at 859 n.39 (emphasis added).
32. Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 576; see generally Susan
Saab Fortney, Ethics Counsel’s Role in Combating the “Ostrich” Tendency, 2002 THE
PROF. LAW. 131. Professor Fortney’s data, from Texas, reflect that the percentage of firms
with formal ethics specialization increases as the firms get larger. Id. at 136.
33. Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 570-83.
34. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson, Uncivil Litigation: Problematic Behavior in Large Law
Firms, J. KANSAS B. ASS’N, Mar. 1997, at 24 (some lawyers in a study were skeptical about
the value of ethics committees or advisers, “observing that associates would still be reluctant
to raise concerns about the ethical practices of their superiors, and partners would be
unlikely to know or pursue questions about the conduct of their peers”); see generally
Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 572-75.
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when they need to consult the experts. One significant concern voiced by
ethics specialists is that their colleagues are not attuned to the ethics issues
that will inevitably arise in their practice and will not know enough to seek
help. 35 The experts, moreover, resist any suggestion that the advice be
mandatory, viewing it as more palatable if the impetus for seeking advice
comes from the lawyer. 36 Ethics awareness is far from intuitive; systems of
ethical infrastructure are only likely to be as responsive as a sensitized
population of lawyers can make them.
Not only are junior lawyers expected to work fast and develop expertise,
the pressure of the large salaries they are paid means that the opportunities
for collaborative work are reduced. 37 These staffing pressures leave junior
lawyers isolated, working in large part on their own, without adequate
opportunities for mentorship, 38 and lacking a venue for dialogue and
engagement on ethics issues. 39 One commentator describes them as “raised
by wolves,” learning their ethics-related behavior by observing their
colleagues in the wild.40
35. Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 587 (specialists “worry that
some questions never come to their attention,” worry about how to get colleagues “to raise
rather than ignore ethical questions,” and express concern that there is “‘a tremendous
amount of ignorance about ethics’”). Noted one participant, “‘Ninety percent of the problem
is getting people to spot the issues and pick up the phone and call you.’” Id.
36. Jarvis & Fucile, supra note 27, at 24 (“We believe that our advice will be best
received if it is voluntarily sought. We have, in fact, opposed efforts at the firm to make
consultation with us mandatory in some or all situations that raise ethics issues.”).
37. Susan Zentay, After the Gold Rush, MIAMI DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW, Oct. 12, 2004
at 7 (“[S]alary increases ‘put an absurd amount of pressure on associates [and fostered a]
notion of shut up and produce.’”).
38. Patrick Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School,
and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 739-40 (1998)
(“Thus pressure to bill hours—pressure to ‘bill or be banished’—is necessarily pressure not
to mentor.”). In one study, forty-three percent of associates agreed with this statement:
“Because of the pressure on partners to bill and generate business, partners in my firm do
not provide the mentoring and training that I need and want.” Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for
Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of
Billable Hour Requirements, 69 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 239, 283 (2000).
39. See Suchman, supra note 22, at 863; see also Molly Peckman, On the Care and
Feeding of Associates, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 3, 2004, at 7 (“In fact, the need for
mentoring new lawyers has never been greater, since BlackBerrys, e-mails, cell phones and
facsimiles have destroyed most lawyer-to-lawyer contact . . . . Gone are the days when new
lawyers served internships or apprenticeships before beginning to practice and were
welcomed into the profession by preceptors. And while most prominent attorneys credit
their success to mentors, many young lawyers wither for lack of such attention.”).
40. Suchman, supra note 22, at 869. Comments another author, “In the absence of
mentoring, the individual is often left to her own perceived self-interest and moral code and,
faced with this climate, looks to rules—including those sanctioning the default norms of
‘tough’ adversariness—or outside reference groups for guidance in making decisions.”
Douglas N. Frenkel, Ethics Beyond the Rules—Questions and Possible Responses, 67
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This phenomenon may be hard to perceive because firms view
themselves as providing more training opportunities to their junior lawyers
than they did in the past. As was clear in the presentations at this
conference, large law firms have broadly expanded their formal training
activities, and give the appearance that younger lawyers are being taught
more and trained more. But this more formalized programming may be
usurping for more informal opportunities for the hands-on participation and
mentoring that may have been prevalent in the past. Economic pressures
mean that “[w]hat was once an easy, accepted part of big-firm practice has
taken on a more studied and formal character.” 41 While this seems
satisfactory to firm managers, it may be less so to associates, who may not
find that the formal programming meets their needs. 42 Associates in one
study complained in particular about inadequate ethics training, arguing
“that formal ethical training tended to neglect day-to-day issues, and that it
provided insufficient guidance in dealing with the sharp practices of
opponents.” 43 Junior lawyers are doing more and therefore are expected to
exercise judgment and discretion more often than in the past. Yet they may
be doing so with less in the way of knowledge and judgment.
As junior lawyers are expected to move faster, and respond in real time
to the needs of their clients and perhaps their supervisors as well, as they
are being urged to specialize early and develop expertise, as they’re being
encouraged to rely on an infrastructure of ethical consultation and support,
as they work in an increasingly independent and sometimes isolated
professional environment, what’s happening to the materials we’re
expecting them to absorb to appreciate their ethical obligations? They’re
getting longer and more complex. 44

FORDHAM L. REV. 875, 880 (1998).
41. Sarat, supra note 27, at 825. He continues:
“[f]irms create Professional Responsibility Committees, institute lunches among
partners to discuss targeted questions about professional conduct, and/or designate
ombudsmen to whom questions about ethics and professionalism can be referred.
Thus, if one just looked at the organization chart, one would think that firms were
deeply invested in their socialization and social control functions.”
Id.
42. In one study, associates “were much less satisfied with the current training regime
than were partners.” Suchman, supra note 22, at 862.
43. Id.
44. I am not the first to note this. See Wernz, supra note 14, at 187-88 (noting that “in
the last decade the law of conflicts of interest for lawyers has become increasingly
complicated,” that the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers devotes 181
pages to conflicts, and that Model Rule 1.7 has thirty-five comments).
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III. THE IMPERMEABILITY OF DOCTRINE
The ABA=s first venture into the articulation of standards for ethics was
the 1908 Canons of Ethics. There were thirty-two of them, and they
covered about nine pages of the ABA reports. 45 Today’s ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct encompass fifty-seven rules, but that’s not
really a fair count, because most of those rules encompass multiple
subparts, incorporating many different rules. 46 A fairer assessment of how
dense these rules are might be understood by looking at the Comments,
which purport to provide helpful interpretive guidance for the rules.47 The
current version of the Model Rules includes 444 comments.
One place to look for evidence that these rules have gotten too dense and
complex to be relevant to the average lawyer is to consider whether
members of the bar have participated in commenting on proposed rule
changes. One might hypothesize that as the rules become denser and more
complex, ordinary practitioners participate less in the process of reviewing
and commenting on proposed changes. 48 Recent efforts by various
jurisdictions to adopt various portions of the post-Ethics 2000 revisions to
the Model Rules create an opportunity to consider that hypothesis. For the
most part, jurisdictions that have completed the process of making such

45. See Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year
Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, n.2 (2004) (citing AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE
THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING 575-84 (1908)). Earlier approaches were briefer still;
David Dudley Field, the author of New York’s Field Code, offered a series of eight statutory
duties which were adopted in several states. See id. at 1423-25 & n.278. David Hoffman’s
“Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment” numbered fifty duties. DAVID
HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-775 (1836). Hoffman’s fiftieth resolution was
to urge lawyers to reread these fifty resolutions twice a year. See id. at 775.
46. For example, Model Rule 1.8, which deals with a series of miscellaneous conflictof-interest rules, actually encompasses eleven distinct rules (denominated 1.8(a)-(k)); Model
Rule 3.4 has six distinct subparts, but actually includes more than six separate rules.
47. The Preamble includes twenty-one comments. Below is a list of each of the current
Model Rules, followed by the number of comments associated with each rule:
Rule 1.0: 10; Rule 1.1: 6; Rule 1.2: 13; Rule 1.3: 5; Rule 1.4: 7; Rule 1.5: 9; Rule
1.6: 18; Rule 1.7: 35; Rule 1.8: 20; Rule 1.9: 9; Rule 1.10: 8; Rule 1.11: 10; Rule
1.12: 5; Rule 1.13: 14; Rule 1.14:9; Rule 1.15: 6; Rule 1.16:9; Rule 1.17: 15; Rule
1.18: 9; Rule 2.1: 5; Rule 2.3: 6; Rule 2.4: 5; Rule 3.1: 3; Rule 3.2: 1; Rule 3.3:
15; Rule 3.4: 4; Rule 3.5: 5; Rule 3.6: 8; Rule 3.7: 7; Rule 3.8: 6; Rule 3.9: 3; Rule
4.1: 3; Rule 4.2: 9; Rule 4.3: 2; Rule 4.4: 3; Rule 5.1: 8; Rule 5.2: 2; Rule 5.3: 2;
Rule 5.4: 2; Rule 5.5: 21; Rule 5.6: 3; Rule 5.7: 11; Rule 6.1: 12; Rule 6.2: 3; Rule
6.3: 2; Rule 6.4: 1; Rule 7.1: 4; Rule 7.2: 8; Rule 7.3: 8; Rule 7.4: 3; Rule 7.5: 2;
Rule 7.6: 6; Rule 8.1: 3; Rule 8.2: 3; Rule 8.3: 5; Rule 8.4: 5; Rule 8.5: 7.
48. The Iowa Supreme Court’s recent promulgation of a new version of the ethics rules
produced a draft of about two-hundred single-spaced pages. As one might imagine, few
practitioners undertook the lengthy process of reviewing those pages when comments were
solicited by our Supreme Court. See infra note 49.
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changes note scant comment from members of the bar on these proposed
changes. 49 By contrast, the American Bar Association’s solicitation of
comments on a draft of the 1908 rules drew more than one thousand letters
of comment. 50
49. A telephonic survey of jurisdictions making recent changes to their ethics rules in
response to Ethics 2000 reflected that few comments on those changes were received from
members of the bar. Telephone Survey conducted by Justin McCarty, Research Assistant,
University of Iowa Law School, Iowa City, Iowa (August 2005) (on file with the author).
Delaware reported fewer than two dozen comments, Indiana approximately twenty-five, and
Montana “just a handful.” Id. New Jersey noted “a dozen or so,” but they came from bar
associations rather than individual lawyers. Id. North Carolina reported fewer than fifty
(the precise number was twenty-three), Oregon reported “only a handful,” Pennsylvania
received “fewer than a dozen” comments, and South Dakota reported receiving none. Three
states indicated more significant comment on recent changes; Arizona reported “hundreds”
of comments; and Louisiana and Maryland reported “a fair number.” Id.
The Maryland comments take up eighty-four pages of the final report. The multiple
comments, when analyzed, came from only twenty-three commenters. See REPORT OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND TO STUDY THE
ETHICS 2000 AMENDMENTS TO THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Dec.
16,
2003)
[hereinafter
Maryland
Report],
available
at
www.courts.state.md.us/lawyersropc_finalrept03.pdf.The breakdown of those comments is
edifying.
One came from bar counsel, six from representatives of professional
organizations, two from law school faculty members, and four from bar associations. Id.
Only ten came from individual lawyers. Of those, one came from members of a firm ethics
committee and one from a lawyer in his capacity as the attorney for a lawyer-client in a
disciplinary proceeding. Id.
The North Carolina experience was almost eerily similar. The North Carolina State
Bar received twenty-three comments in response to its draft revisions to the state legal ethics
rules prepared in light of Ethics 2000. 2003-2004 Letters of Comment on Proposed
Changes to the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct (on file with author). Of the
twenty-three, one came from a judge, four came from lawyers speaking on behalf of
professional organizations, one came from a lawyer speaking on behalf of a client, and three
came from the same U.S. attorney. Id. Of the remaining fourteen comments, ten were emails, one reporting a typo, and four consisted of eight lines or less. Id.
The results were even more striking in Iowa. When the Iowa Supreme Court
solicited comments on its recent and significant revisions to the state’s ethics rules, the
Court received nineteen comments. Public Comments Received by Clerk in the Matter of
the Proposed Adoption of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct (on file with author).
One was from the Drafting Committee appointed by the Supreme Court to propose revisions
and one was from the Reporter of that committee. Id. Two comments were from
government departments, three from professional organizations, and one from a state task
force, one from Legal Aid and one from a law firm. Id. Two comments appeared to be from
individuals who are not lawyers. There were seven comments from individual lawyers.
Despite the fact that the revisions proposed significant changes to, inter alia, the rules on
confidentiality (including the novel institution of a mandatory disclosure provision) and on
multijurisdictional practice, few lawyers appeared to note or comment upon those changes.
Id.
More and more systematic research would certainly be appropriate, but the
conclusion that the average practitioner has little interest in the process of rule revision
seems borne out by this experience.
50. See Andrews, supra note 45, at 1440.
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The density of these rules has the potential to have a significant
impact. 51 The theory of the rules is no longer, as perhaps it was with the
early ethics codes, that lawyers would review them regularly and remind
themselves of the principles governing the lawyer’s role. 52 That cheerful
naivete of earlier eras—that a single, relatively simple, code of behavior
would be enough to advise lawyers of their ethical obligations—is gone.
But no concept of how the average lawyer should become or remain
familiar with the principles of professional responsibility has replaced it.
Professor Chambliss accuses me of a misplaced nostalgia for a time that
never was, when individual lawyers thoroughly understood the ethics rules
and attended conscientiously to their obligations under them. Her criticism
is fairly taken; such a golden age of individual responsibility probably
never existed. But to say that is not to abandon the notion that individual
awareness and sensitization to the issues presented by the governing
principles remains important. For a lawyer previously unfamiliar with the
fifty-seven Model Rules and their 444 comments. Reviewing them would
require a lengthy period of intense study. 53 Such study, moreover, would
not seem to be what an unschooled reader was looking for. It would not be
a general reminder of lawyerly principles, but rather like a research
exercise, more appropriate for a specialist. 54
51. One author argues that the effect of the repeated redrafting of the rules of lawyer
behavior is “to maximize the number of lawyers who know and follow the minimum rules
of the profession,” or “to make it easier to follow the minimum standards.” Benjamin H.
Barton, The ABA, The Rules and Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call
for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV.
411, 421 (2005). The increased complexity of the Model Rules suggests that, if this is the
goal of what Professor Barton terms the “minimalist” project, it is not particularly effective.
One comment received by the North Carolina State Bar during its notice and comment
period is pertinent here: “I am as I have been for several years, truly disturbed that we have
50 pages of ethics. To my mind, a lawyer has no ability to determine what is ethical, all is
left up to a small group who, essentially, sit on a throne in a distant city to make that
judgment . . . . Can’t you people come up with shorter rules? How in the world can you
expect a lawyer to know and understand pages of small typed pages of rules.” Letter from
Richard L. Griffin to Alice Neece Mine, Assistant Executive Director, The North Carolina
State Bar (Sept. 30, 2002)(on file with author).
52. Hoffman’s fiftieth Resolution in Regard to Professional Deportment was that
lawyers should read the first forty-nine twice a year during their professional lives. See
supra note 45.
53. Perhaps this is why the many lawyers in one study indicated no knowledge of
changes to their state professional responsibility rules. See Levin, supra note 16, at 369-70
(lawyers in her study “freely admitted that they did not keep up-to-date” on the state ethics
code “and that they had not consulted it since law school”).
54. I note parenthetically that the mechanism of rules revision may not make changes
easily accessible to members of the practicing bar. Techniques like underlining proposed
changes, preparing executive summaries, and creating easily accessible and readable online
documents might facilitate broader participation in rule revision. Note one attorney’s
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Many of these rules, moreover, are irrelevant to large areas of the
practice; while all lawyers may be interested in the rules regarding
confidentiality, client loyalty, or competence, rules regarding the special
obligations of prosecutors or the management of pretrial publicity may be
of more limited interest.
The rules are long because legal ethics issues are complex. 55 But we
often boil complex issues down to simpler, though perhaps less clear and
less precise rules. 56 The command that “thou shalt not kill” does not take
account of the need for self-defense or the exigencies of war, but it
articulates a pretty good basic principle for governing conduct. It is not the
only text available; an expert has access to tools that can facilitate a more
complete exegesis in the case of a more complex or nuanced problem.
Ordinarily, however, we do not assume that the expert and the man on the
street must be guided by identical texts. The general principle can be relied
upon to govern most people most of the time.
One might ask whether the professionalization of ethics is exacerbated
by our existing rules, which fail to distinguish between the complex and
specialized guidance needed for the ethics expert and the general principles
that should guide every lawyer. One might conclude from this that there
are no such immutable principles, that all ethics issues are technical issues
to be attended to by the experts, and that the ordinary practitioner need not
trouble himself about them very much. 57 A complex and professionalized
ethics system, while it provides resources for lawyers in an environment
where there is ethics infrastructure, may provide little for those who are
not. In one study, when asked how they resolved ethical dilemmas,

comment on Maryland’s proposed changes:
“I am writing to suggest that the process of viewing proposed changes would be
a[sic] 1,000 times easier if the Committee adopted a form . . . to clearly
differential [sic] the current from the proposed. I am not sure how arduous a task
it will be to try to compare the two. Also, I would suggest that the Committee
publish only the changed Rule section and any altered or added Comment(s). The
document will be much more handleable and easier to compare.”
Maryland Report, supra note 49, at 406.
55. Wernz, supra note 14, at 182, 186 (explaining that “Morality for lawyers, especially
advocates, is, in special ways, deep, complicated and inherently ambiguous,” and “[E]thics
for lawyers, as opposed to other professions and occupations, is an especially knotty and
ambiguous challenge.”).
56. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that the law’s
“successful operation over vast areas of social life depends on a widely diffused capacity to
recognize particular acts, things, and circumstances as instances of the general classification
which the law makes”).
57. See Wernz, supra note 14, at 187 (“Lawyers in large firms are faced with an
important, but hidden, ethical issue—the temptation to think that their practices do not
involve moral issues.”).
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respondents answered that they “mostly fly by the seat of their pants.” 58
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
What prescription can we take from this for training our young lawyers?
I offer three: focus on specialty-specific ethics education, acknowledge the
contribution of the ethics specialists, and (this is a much more complex
proposition) draft our ethics rules differently.
A. Specialty-Specific Ethics Training
First, specialty-specific ethics education is important. It retains its
relevance even for a specialization-driven practice; education about who
the client is in an estate planning practice, or what Sarbanes-Oxley requires
in a corporate practice, or how litigators should deal with email
communications, provides training directly relevant to the lawyers’ current
practice. It also narrows somewhat the breadth of what must be
understood. Rather than suggesting that every lawyer must master a
complex body of what appears, to some, to be irrelevant doctrine, such
training makes the concepts relevant to a particular practice more
accessible and gives lawyers more confidence that they can reason
knowledgeably and appropriately in this area. 59 Of course, there are limits
to the categorization of ethics; there are many areas we can imagine, from
client confidentiality to conflicts of interest, where general education is still
critical.
B. Valuing the Ethics Specialist
If the “ethical infrastructure” of law firms is to play a significant role in
helping young lawyers to recognize the importance of professional
responsibility to their practices, then the ethics specialists must be
acknowledged as full and valued contributors to the practice. Actions
speak louder than words; if ethics expertise is a backwater for the practice,
that will signal to junior lawyers that it is an area that should be avoided.

58. Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard to Be a Human Being and a
Lawyer”: Young Attorneys and the Confrontation With Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice,
105 W. VA. L. REV. 495, 512 & n.73 (2003).
59. Enhanced specialty-specific ethics training would be a welcome contribution; noted
one senior associate in a study, “it is very hard, in my opinion, to find ABA ethics classes
that actually speak to somebody who faces the dilemmas that I face. For example, I am a
mid-level associate. I have just started now dealing with expert witnesses . . . . It would be
really useful to me if somebody were to give a seminar on the ethical dilemmas that I might
face and how to deal with those, but the ABA and the [State Bar Association] don’t seem to
have that, and it’s something my firm is not providing.” Suchman, supra note 22, at 862.
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Adequate compensation, institutional respect, and appropriate authority for
the ethics specialist will reflect law firms’ intention to treat such
specializations as valuable and productive.
C. Revisit the Rules
Many scholars have critiqued the character of the Model Rules, arguing
that they are legalistic rather than aspirational, impose a minimalist rather
than lofty standard for lawyer conduct, and fail to create adequate
opportunity for the lawyer’s exercise of her own ethical judgment. My
claim here is much more modest: when rules are too long and complex,
they lose their pertinence for lawyers who are not ethics specialists. The
need to write rules which provide examples and analyses of every possible
issue or concern has made it more and more difficult for practitioners to
independently utilize ethics resources; they may come to think of ethics as
a specialty area, where they are incompetent to render our own decisions
and must consult an expert. While ethics consultation is a lucrative
business for many, we should be profoundly concerned if the
professionalization of ethics results in less individual connection to
professional responsibility.
We have two alternatives in thinking about this problem. First, we could
move to a shorter and simpler rules model, perhaps one which separates the
comments from the text of the Model Rules and treats them instead as
advisory committee notes. The rules, standing alone, would be a much
more manageable document for lawyers to digest, while the comments
would remain available to anyone seeking further guidance on a particular
issue.
While this would be a functional solution, it would not be an optimal
one, because the rules alone reflect a floor, not a ceiling. Encouraging
lawyers to look to the disciplinary rules alone to guide their conduct as
lawyers is, in a larger sense, a bit like encouraging citizens to use state
penal codes to govern their behavior. They’ll err on the side of lawful
conduct, but not by much. Our goal is somewhat loftier, perhaps embodied
in Professor Sarat’s view that:
At the heart of this idea of lawyer professionalism is a vision of autonomy
and ethical practice, of civility and decorum in the daily life of lawyers,
and of lawyers committed to and regulated by a set of principles encoded
in the profession’s Model Rules. The image of lawyer as statesman looms
large as the unspoken model to which lawyers should aspire. In this
image, lawyers’ ethics go beyond strict adherence to professional rules.
Rather, they reflect the dictates of practical wisdom, a capacious sense of
the public interest, and a judicious ability to see and reconcile the client=s
long-term interest with the best interest of both law and the society it
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serves. 60

Besides, lawyers already tend to perceive ethical issues as purely legal
issues—rules to be “lawyered,” subject to the analysis, interpretation and
hair-splitting that many lawyers view as their obligation when serving the
interests of a client.61 Only breaches of the disciplinary rules are ethically
unacceptable. 62 And the rules are perceived as “easy” because, to the nonethics expert, “the rules are mostly clear.” 63 One scholar writes, “As long
as their behavior breaks none of the canons of professional responsibility,
respondents are absolved of guilt. One respondent dislikes representing
toxic polluters, but following the principle of zealous advocacy, he reports
that; ‘I just close my eyes and do it.’” 64 The rules are not intended to be a
replacement for thinking ethically, but such comments and practices might
suggest they are. Moreover, disciplinary rules are unlikely to matter much
to large-firm lawyers. “They’re rarely subjected to discipline for rule
violations the consequences of unethical conduct for lawyers in large firms
tend to be internal rather than external.” 65
Instead, perhaps we need a new document—a straightforward expression
of the principles underlying the ethical practice of law. Too general? Sure.
Unenforceable? Probably. 66 But a document that would be easily
reviewable by every practicing lawyer, twice a year, one which would
create a shared set of norms acknowledged and reinforced even by those

60. Sarat, supra note 27, at 816.
61. See Barton, supra note 1, at 453-54 (arguing that the “black letter” format of the
rules “trigger[s] a particular heuristic in lawyers: we are trained to carefully read and
analyse rules to find (as precisely as possible) the boundary between legal and illegal
behavior . . . . When lawyers apply this boundary seeking process to issues of legal ethics
the technical legal question (what am I allowed to do?) frequently eclipses the broader moral
question (what should I do?).”).
62. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 710 (1998) (noting based on a series of interviews
with large-firm lawyers that “[e]thically inappropriate behavior (in the standard take) is
defined narrowly as a violation of the rules”).
63. Id. at 711. Gordon indicates that this is the first layer, which he refers to as the
“standard take” on legal ethics issues in large law firms, and reflects a considerably more
complex and nuanced perception in subsequent discussion. See id. at 712.
64. Granfield & Koenig, supra note 58, at 514.
65. See Frenkel, supra note 40, at 877 (individual discipline “tends to be rather private,
rare in the segment of the bar [large private firms] we studied, limited by the scarce
resources of enforcement offices and confined to after-the-fact policing of conduct that has
clearly crossed the line”).
66. But see Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory,
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 236
(1993) (noting that “[t]o the extent the professional codes appropriately rest on the
assumption that lawyers will respond to guidance, clear rules and punishment for violation
of those rules are not always necessary to produce desirable conduct”).
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lawyers too busy to spend much time on ethics, would be a valuable start.67
Such an approach would play some role in “de-professionalizing” ethics
and reminding each lawyer of her obligation to be an ethical practitioner.

67. Professor Gordon notes the need to “reinvigorate” professional ideals of obligations
to the framework of justice. As he notes, “successful systems of norms depend on shared
understandings and informal sanctions of communities. Externally imposed rules and
sanctions of regulatory regimes can reinforce, but cannot substitute, for such informal norms
and sanctions.” Gordon, supra note 11, at 737.

